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This paper uses a text-driven approach to explore epistemological position-
ing (the expression of assessments concerning knowledge) in English news-
papers. The notion of epistemological positioning (EP) often overlaps with
evidentiality—the linguistic marking of the basis of speaker/writer knowl-
edge. This is a relatively modern concept in linguistics and, compared to the
amount of research it has attracted concerning other languages, it has been
somewhat neglected in research focusing on English. Newspaper texts are a
particularly good source for looking into EP and evidentiality, because the
news story is a genre that is preoccupied with knowledge. The analysis
shows that EP in English can be very complex, and that the distinction be-
tween attribution and averral (Sinclair 1988) needs to be taken into ac-
count when discussing it in naturally occurring texts (particularly in news
texts). The resulting elements of EP that are identiﬁed for the English lan-
guage o¤er a ﬁrst glance at the possibilities to express EP in English, and
open up future research on EP in di¤erent registers and text types.
Keywords: epistemological positioning; evidentiality; attribution; averral;
subjectivity; news discourse.
1. Introduction
This paper is about the linguistic expression of assessments concerning
knowledge, exploring what is here called epistemological positioning
(EP). Epistemological positioning deals with questions such as ‘Who is
the source of information?’, ‘What is the basis of someone’s (the writer’s
or a third party’s) knowledge?’, ‘How certain is their knowledge?’ etc.1
EP thus overlaps partly with the notion of evidentiality—the linguistic
marking of evidence. This is a concept that has largely been applied to
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languages other than English (see Section 2), even though it appears that
expressions of evidentiality have a variety of important pragmatic func-
tions. This paper aims to direct linguistic attention to epistemological po-
sitioning as an object worthy of further research and systematization of
analysis. In Section 2, I discuss the connection between evidentiality and
EP. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the text-driven approach of
this paper (3.1); outlines the connection between sourcing (attribution/
averral), evidentiality, and subjectivity (3.2 and 3.3); and considers episte-
mological reasoning (backing) to a certain extent (3.4). Section 4 gives a
brief conclusion and a suggested outline of elements of EP that need to be
considered in the analysis of naturally occurring discourse.
2. Evidentiality and epistemological positioning
Initially, the concept of evidentiality originated with the early American-
ists (Boas, Sapir, Swadesh, Hoijer), but the term evidential was probably
introduced by Roman Jakobson (1971 [1957]) as a provisional label for a
verbal category that indicates the basis of the information on which a
speaker’s/writer’s statement is based (Jacobsen 1986: 3–7; Bybee and
Fleischman 1995: 13). However, as Comrie (2000: 1) points out, it was
only in the mid to late 1980s that a swell in interest in evidentiality oc-
curred (e.g., Givo´n 1982; Chafe and Nichols 1986; Willet 1988), which
has resurged in the mid to late 1990s (e.g., Hill and Irvine 1993b; De-
Lancey 1997), and appears still to be going on (recent research includes
Johanson and Utas 2000; Mushin 2001; Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003;
Aikhenvald 2004). Evidentiality and markers of evidentiality, eviden-
tials, are nowadays deﬁned in diverse ways;2 however, broadly speaking,
two main approaches can be distinguished (as ﬁrst suggested by Chafe
1986).
In a narrow deﬁnition, ‘evidentials express the kinds of evidence a per-
son has for making factual claims’ (Anderson 1986: 273). Included are
linguistic forms that mark the speaker’s/writer’s basis of knowledge as
something seen, heard, inferred, or told (see, e.g., Du Bois 1986; Hill
and Irvine 1993a).3 Often, such research regards only grammaticalized
expressions as evidentiality (e.g., Aikhenvald 2004: 6), in particular evi-
dential morphemes. As Mushin (2001: 35) notes, ‘[t]he linguistic study of
evidentiality has been primarily concerned with the status of evidential
forms and evidential meanings in morphological systems’. This results in
the quasi-total exclusion of the English language from such (mostly typo-
logical) research. Thus we can ﬁnd that the majority of research on evi-
dentiality in fact deals with languages other than English, usually more
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‘exotic’ languages such as Albanian, Northern Iroquoian, Wintu, and
many others (compare Chafe and Nichols 1986; Guentche´va 1996; Jo-
hanson and Utas 2000; Dendale and Tasmowski 2001; Aikhenvald and
Dixon 2003; for more studies see de Haan’s 2001 bibliography on eviden-
tiality and the references in Aikhenvald 2004). Compared to this wealth
of research, there are only a few studies investigating the concept of evi-
dentiality in the English language.4
In a broader deﬁnition, the term evidential has come to ‘[cover] much
more than the marking of evidence per se’ (Chafe and Nichols 1986:
vii). In this approach, evidentiality, or epistemological stance, as Mushin
(2001) calls it, involves various ‘attitudes towards knowledge’ (Chafe
1986: 262), and evidence is only one of the epistemological considerations
that are linguistically encoded (Chafe 1986: 262). Evidentiality in this
sense is concerned with matters of truth, certainty, doubt, reliability,
authority, conﬁdence, personal experience, validity, inference, reporting,
factual and imaginative stance, evidence, conﬁrmation, surprise, and ex-
pectedness (Chafe and Nichols 1986; Ca‰ and Janney 1994; Stubbs 1996;
Mushin 2001).
Any researcher addressing the notion of evidentiality must thus ask
him/herself whether to adopt the narrow or the broad view of evidential-
ity (Mushin 2001: 51). If we consider evidentiality in its narrow deﬁnition,
it is only one part of the greater study of epistemological positioning—
that aspect of EP that marks the basis of the speaker’s/writer’s knowl-
edge. Concerning evidentiality in its broader deﬁnition, there is much
more overlap with the concept of epistemological positioning. However,
I prefer using the term epistemological positioning (rather than evidential-
ity), because of the etymological roots involved (epistemological derives
from Greek episte¯me¯, ‘knowledge’, whereas evidential automatically calls
up notions of evidence). This also reduces terminological confusion and
might help us to distinguish more clearly between di¤erent types of ‘atti-
tudes towards knowledge’, o¤ering a sharper perspective. Furthermore, it
is convenient to have available the usage of the term evidentiality to refer
to a speciﬁc subcategory of EP, that of marking evidence (for criticism of
evidentiality in a broad deﬁnition, cf. also Aikhenvald 2003: 19).5 On the
other hand, the research by Chafe and others provides a useful spring-
board for the analysis of EP. Thus, it could be suggested that epistemo-
logical positioning involves at least the following elements (cf. in partic-
ular Chafe 1986; Biber et al. 1999):
– Basis of knowledge (evidentiality): was it seen, inferred, heard, etc.?
– Certainty of knowledge (epistemic modality): how certain is the
speaker/writer of his/her knowledge?
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– Deviations from knowledge (mirativity): is what the speaker/writer
describes expected or unexpected in terms of his/her knowledge of the
world?6
– Extent: is the knowledge limited in some way?
Linguistically, evidentiality is, for example, expressed by evidential adverbs
such as clearly, notoriously, or famously; mirativity (DeLancey 1997) can
be expressed by ‘expectational’ adverbs such as amazingly, surprisingly;
and extent of knowledge can be marked by adverbs and propositional
phrases (generally, in most cases). Certainty of knowledge can either be
directly expressed through the use of epistemic modal expressions (may,
perhaps, must) or indirectly marked by evidential expressions:7 the reason
for this is that there is a connection (but no direct correlation) between
the type of evidence that is given and certainty of knowledge. In Chafe’s
(1986: 266) words: ‘mode of knowing implies something about reliability’
(compare also Willett 1988). For instance, it is assumed by researchers
that direct evidence (e.g., visual data) is considered by speakers to be ‘the
most certain kind of knowledge’ (Sweetser 1984: 13).
In this paper I mainly want to consider bases of writer knowledge (evi-
dentiality), though certainty of knowledge (modality) will also play a role.
Mirativity and extent of knowledge, however, will not be considered here
(see Bednarek 2006a for a discussion of un/expectedness). I will also con-
nect the notion of evidentiality to the concept of sourcing, a concept that
is crucial to news discourse and needs to be introduced in order to discuss
EP in naturally occurring text data. Sourcing gives us an answer to one of
the important questions that readers may ask of a news text: ‘to whom
can this be attributed?’
3. Epistemological positioning, sourcing, and subjectivity
3.1. A text-driven approach to EP in English
In order to ﬁnd out more about what kinds of epistemological categories
can be expressed in the English language, I manually analyzed a corpus
of 70,000 words of British English newspaper reportage (see Table 1 in
Appendix). This kind of approach represents a text-driven methodology,
trying to make as few theoretical assumptions as possible before analyz-
ing the text data, rather than using a previously established theoretical
framework to classify the data (e.g., Chafe’s categories). I use the term
text-driven in analogy to Tognini-Bonelli’s distinction between corpus-
driven and corpus-based linguistics. The term corpus-based is employed ‘to
refer to a methodology that avails itself of the corpus mainly to expound,
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test or exemplify theories and descriptions that were formulated before
large corpora became available to inform language study’ (Tognini-
Bonelli 2001: 65), and the term corpus-driven refers to an approach where
‘the commitment of the linguist is to the integrity of the data as a whole,
and descriptions aim to be comprehensive with respect to corpus evi-
dence’ (2001: 84). In analogy, the term text-driven refers to a methodol-
ogy that is based on the manual analysis of small-scale text corpora rather
than to an approach that is based on automated large-scale corpus anal-
yses.8 In other words, I went through the corpus ‘hunting’ for expressions
relating to EP (focusing mainly on evidentiality), without categorizing
them in more detail on an a priori basis. Newspaper texts are a particu-
larly good source for researching EP, because the news story is a genre
that is preoccupied with knowledge. Therefore, the analysis of the corpus
presumably gives us a good ﬁrst glance at the possibilities to express EP
in English. However, there is no assumption that the categories found in
this corpus are exhaustive or cover all means of expressing EP in English
(i.e., are representative of the English language as a whole). In any case,
the concept of EP needs more elaboration, incorporating research from
cognitive linguistics and philosophy concerning knowledge and knowl-
edge structures.
3.2. Sources and bases of propositions
Before looking at the text data in more detail, it is useful to make a basic
distinction between the sources and bases of propositions. In the follow-
ing, source of propositions refers to the source to which knowledge can be
attributed (who is ‘responsible’ for the content of the modiﬁed utterance).
In contrast, basis of propositions concerns the basis (or evidence) for the
source’s knowledge (confusingly, the term source is usually used in evi-
dentiality studies for such evidence, but, as will be seen presently, it is use-
ful to distinguish clearly between these two notions). For example, in the
utterance But some visibly ﬂinched as he stooped to gutter politics with
vicious personal attacks on political opponents, the source of the informa-
tion is the writer and the basis of his/her knowledge is sensory evidence
(visibly).
Thus, the ﬁrst concept to be addressed is sourcing: who is mentioned as
the source of a proposition in news reportage? Ordinarily, the source is
either the writer (Self ) as in Example (1) or a third party (Other) as in Ex-
ample (2) (cf. also Hunston 2000: 190):
(1) Pele´, perhaps the greatest-ever footballer, . . . . (Times)
! Source ¼ Self (the writer)
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(2) ‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constit-
uency chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved
in the plot,’ said one source. (Express)
! Source ¼ Other (one source)
The next question to be addressed is the basis of the source’s (Self or
Other) knowledge (evidentiality). On the basis of the corpus, the follow-






These categories will now be discussed in more detail with the help of ex-
amples. The category of perception encompasses three di¤erent kinds of
perception that have been reduced to one general parameter for method-
ological purposes: ‘mental perception’ (Greenbaum 1969: 205) or infer-
ence (seem, appear, look), sensory perception (look, see, visibly, audibly),
and ‘showing’ (reveal, show, betray, conﬁrm). Mental perception shades
into sensory perception in many cases, and the di¤erence between sensory
perception and showing is predominantly one of construal. Here are some
examples of perception evidentials from the corpus:
(3) MacDonald, dubbed the Queen of Tarts, looked distraught as the
verdict was read out in a Paris court on her 44th birthday. (Express)
(sensory perception)
(4) But some visibly ﬂinched as he stooped to gutter politics with
vicious personal attacks on political opponents. (Mirror) (sensory
perception)
(5) Terrorists appear to have adopted a sinister new tactic in Iraq after a
Western-looking suicide bomber tried to wipe out the country’s
ﬂedgling government and U.S. security sta¤. (Mail ) (mental percep-
tion or inference)
Concerning general knowledge, the propositional content of what is
modiﬁed is marked as based on what is regarded as part of the communal
epistemic background shared by the audience and the writer ( famously,
infamously), whereas proof relates to a marking of the proposition as be-
ing based on some sort of ‘hard proof ’ (tests found ):
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(6) Mr Burrell, who Diana famously called her ‘rock’, said: . . . .
(Independent)
(7) Twelve years after Gerald Ratner infamously described some of his
jewellery as ‘total crap’, the boss of Britain’s biggest credit card com-
pany yesterday stunned his customers with what appeared to be a
similar vote of no conﬁdence in his own product. (Guardian)
(8) Tests found he was driving at almost 70 mph and was more than
three times over the legal alcohol limit. (Express)
Concerning the category of obviousness, this refers to expressions such as
clearly, which suggest that the basis of the writer’s knowledge lies in the
obviousness or self-evidence of what is modiﬁed (other candidates for this
category are thus expressions such as obvious(ly) or plain(ly), which,
however, do not occur in the corpus). The meaning of this category is
very close to that of perception, and can be paraphrased as ‘not needing
evidence’ (for a di¤erent interpretation of clearly, see Bednarek 2006b).
Some examples are:
(9) Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith shakes his ﬁst deﬁantly yesterday—
just as his media advisers clearly told him to. (Sun)
(10) Although the ovations were clearly stage-managed, there was genu-
ine sympathy in the Blackpool conference hall for a man who has
been under the severest strain all week. (Times)
The next category, unspecified, is the most problematic in that it only
relates to one expression found in the corpus, namely it emerged that
(which, however, occurs several times):
(11) It also emerged Hollywood is planning a movie on her life.
(Mirror)
This expression indicates that there is some sort of basis for the modiﬁed
proposition, without stating explicitly what this basis is: emerge is deﬁned
as follows: ‘If a fact or result emerges from a period of thought, discus-
sion or investigation, it becomes known as a result of it’ (COBUILD
2001). It is not clear whether thought, discussion, or investigation are the
bases of the proposition at hand; this remains inexplicit and may only oc-
casionally be inferred from the context. More research is needed on this
category in order to reﬁne it. If there is only one expression (emerge)
that can be included in this category, it might be better to categorize this
expression as indicating general knowledge (since what emerges ‘be-
comes known as a result of it’). If there are other expressions with similar
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meanings (turn out might be a candidate), the establishment of a separate
category (unspecified) may be justiﬁed.
3.3. The interplay of sourcing and evidentiality: Attribution and averral
There is in fact a great amount of interaction between sourcing and evi-
dentiality. To discuss this, the notions of attribution and averral are very
useful. This distinction is adopted from Hunston (2000), drawing herself
on Sinclair (1988). As she puts it, ‘[i]f a piece of language [ . . . ] is attrib-
uted, it is presented as deriving from someone other than the writer. If a
piece of language is averred, the writer him or herself speaks’ (Hunston
2000: 178). For example, an utterance such as John is an idiot is an aver-
ral, whereas within an utterance such as Paul said that John is an idiot,
the proposition John is an idiot is attributed to Paul. Averral and attribu-
tion may be present in one and the same utterance, and the distinction is
made even more complicated by the fact that ‘every attribution is also
averred’ (Hunston 2000: 179), i.e., that ‘every attribution is embedded
within an averral’ (2000: 179). Thus, in Example (2 0), the writer is the ul-
timate source of the entire utterance:
(2 0) ‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constit-
uency chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved
in the plot,’ said one source. (Express)
At the same time, the proposition ‘The whips will be on the phone over the
weekend to all the constituency chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed
as being involved in the plot,’ is attributed to one source. Ultimately, it is
the writer who is responsible for this act of attribution, but it is the source
that is said to be responsible for the attributed proposition. In other
terms:
The writer avers that
‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constituency
chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved in the plot,’
said one source,
(source ¼ Self ), and within this averral attributes the proposition
‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constituency
chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved in the plot,’
to a third party (source of embedded proposition ¼ Other).
In a strict sense, the attributed proposition is thus both part of an averral
and at the same time an attribution. Expressions of EP can be found con-
cerning both the averral (source ¼ Self ) and the attribution (source ¼
Other):
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(2 0) ‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constit-
uency chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved
in the plot,’ said one source.
! source of utterance ¼ Self (writer)
! basis of Self ’s knowledge of attributed proposition ¼ hearsay
! certainty of Self ’s knowledge ¼ not explicitly marked
(2 0) The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constit-
uency chairmen of those who have been identiﬁed as being involved
in the plot
! source of proposition ¼ Other
! basis of Other’s knowing ¼ not given
! certainty of Other’s knowledge that whips be on the phone
¼ high (will )9
In this example, the writer tells us that s/he has knowledge of the propo-
sition The whips . . . plot because someone said so (his/her knowledge is
based on hearsay), but does not comment explicitly on the certainty of
his/her knowledge (said is neutral in this respect) or give other informa-
tion concerning epistemological considerations. S/he sources the proposi-
tion The whips . . . plot to an unnamed Other (one source), but gives no
information about the basis of this Other’s knowledge. There is, however,
an expression of EP considering the certainty of this Other’s knowledge
that the whips . . . be on the phone over the weekend (will is a modal that
indicates high certainty).
Stating that the source of an utterance is not Self but Other can of
course itself be interpreted as giving information about the basis of Self ’s
knowledge. What the writer says is that his/her knowledge is in fact
based on what a third party has either expressed linguistically (hearsay)
or mentally (mindsay). In systemic-functional terms, an utterance can be
marked as having been uttered by a ‘Sayer’ (Halliday and Matthiessen
2004: 252) (¼ hearsay/quoted speech), or as having been thought/felt/
experienced by a ‘Senser’ (2004: 201) (¼ mindsay/quoted mental experi-
ence). An example of hearsay has already been given above; here is an ex-
ample of mindsay. Again, EP can concern the averral or the attribution:
(12) . . . some smart Tories watching on TV thought the performance too
‘mannered’ to appeal to the wider audience at home. (Guardian)
! source of utterance ¼ Self
! basis of Self ’s knowledge of attributed proposition ¼ mindsay/
hearsay10
(12 0) the performance [was] too ‘mannered’ to appeal to the wider audi-
ence at home
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! source of attributed proposition ¼ Other
! basis of Other’s knowledge ¼ thought
! certainty of Other’s knowledge ¼ medium (thought)
Taking into account the above comments on sourcing, the complete list







– hearsay (source ¼ Other)
– mindsay (source ¼ Other)
It must be noted that the notion of sourcing does not just relate to attri-
bution, but may also be relevant to perception, concerning the identity
of the one who perceives. I shall use the term Experiencer to refer to this
type of source (to distinguish it from Sayers and Sensers as sources of ut-
terances). Compare:
(13) MacDonald, dubbed the Queen of Tarts, looked distraught as the
verdict was read out in a Paris court on her 44th birthday. (Express)
! source ¼ Self
! basis of Self ’s knowledge: perception (Experiencer ¼ Self )
! certainty of knowledge ¼ high (looked )
(14) This is drug-scandal star Rio Ferdinand out shopping—on the day
he was meant to have his dope test. The England ace, who claims
he forgot about the test as he was moving house, was seen near
Manchester’s posh Harvey Nichols store. (Star)
! source ¼ Self
! basis of Self ’s knowledge: perception by unnamed Experiencer
(Self/Other)
! certainty of knowledge: high (was seen)
What is relevant here is the source or Experiencer of the perception
(rather than the source of the utterance itself: both examples are averrals:
source ¼ Self ). In the ﬁrst example, it is the writer him/herself who
thinks that MacDonald looked distraught, whereas in the second example,
it is presumably unnamed Others who saw Rio Ferdinand in Manchester,
though the passive conceals the agent (it may in fact have been the writer
him/herself ).
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In news reportage, both examples of Experiencer:Self and of Experi-
encer:Other are frequent. The former often occur in the context of de-
scriptions of news actors’ mental states, e.g., She hung her head and
looked utterly shocked (Express). Since mental states cannot normally be
known to someone other than the Experiencer, this is necessary to justify
their reporting. By pretending that these events are in fact observable
phenomena, i.e., by mentioning sensory evidence for the existence of the
respective mental state in the Experiencer’s mind, the newspapers justify
their report of them. Expressions of Experiencer:Other are also e¤ective
means of providing evidence for statements, and evaluating the reliability
of attributed propositions, as in
(15) The England ace, who claims he forgot about the test as he was
moving house, was seen near Manchester’s posh Harvey Nichols
store. And neighbors have revealed they didn’t see the 24-year-old
move into his new home until September 25—two days later. (Star)
where the perceptual evidence clearly contradicts the footballer’s
statements.
In news discourse, many propositions are also necessarily signaled as
being based on hearsay or mindsay, since such discourse consists pre-
dominantly of ‘embedded talk’ (Bell 1991: 52). This means that the anal-
ysis of EP can become quite complex, as becomes apparent in the follow-
ing examples:
(16) As Pele´, perhaps the greatest-ever footballer, said when he ﬂew into
Newcastle yesterday, many of the country’s young stars appeared
to be losing touch with the qualities that once made them role
models. (Times)
! source of utterance ¼ Self (Writer)
! modiﬁed element1 ¼ Pele´ [is] the greatest-ever footballer
! basis of Self ’s knowing ¼ not explicitly marked
! certainty of knowledge ¼ low ( perhaps)
! modiﬁed element2 ¼ many of the country’s young stars . . .
models.
! basis of Self ’s knowledge ¼ hearsay
(16 0) the country’s young stars appeared to be losing touch with the
qualities that once made them role models.
! source of attributed proposition ¼ Other
! basis of Other’s knowing ¼ (mental) perception (appeared )
! certainty of Other’s knowledge ¼ low (appeared )
! certainty of attributed proposition ¼ high (as Pele´ . . . said )
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In this example, the writer avers ﬁrstly that Pele´ [is] the greatest-ever
footballer, not giving information about the basis of this assessment, but
telling us that his/her certainty of knowledge is low ( perhaps). At the
same time, s/he avers that the proposition (many of the country’s young
stars . . . models) is based on hearsay. For these averrals the writer clearly
is the source (source ¼ Self ). Furthermore, the proposition (many . . .
models) is attributed to Pele´ (source ¼ Other), the basis of his knowledge
is given as (mental) perception, and his certainty of knowledge is classi-
ﬁed as low (appeared ). Additionally, the writer uses a structure that im-
plies that Pele´ is right in his assessment (as Pele´ . . . said; cf. Thompson
1994: 50). Indications of certainty can thus both relate to the Other’s cer-
tainty of knowledge and to the Self ’s assessment concerning the certainty
of the attributed proposition (Thompson [1994] mentions many examples
for the latter, and much linguistic research on English for academic pur-
poses has looked into this).
Another complex example involving EP is Example (17):
(17) During her trial she described herself as ‘an excellent business-
woman’ and the police have good reason to agree with that self-
assessment. (Mail )
Let us for a moment treat this as meaning simply ‘the police have good
reason to say that she is an excellent businesswoman’. The source of this
utterance is Self (it is an averral), but no information is given as to the
basis of the source’s knowledge that the police have good reason to . . . ,
nor is there any explicit information concerning the certainty of Self
knowledge. However, when we look at the attributed proposition
(source ¼ Other) (‘she is an excellent businesswoman’), we can ﬁnd that
the writer gives us the basis of the Other’s knowledge as some sort of
proof (the police have good reason to). Since proof is considered a good
basis or evidence, the certainty of knowledge that is attributed to the po-
lice is rather high (and the writer appears to share their view).
Summing up, we can say that the analysis of EP becomes highly com-
plex when attribution is considered, since expressions of EP can concern
both attribution and averral. For this reason, it is convenient (and neces-
sary) to distinguish between sourcing (who is Sayer, Senser, or Experi-
encer) and evidentiality (what is the basis of knowledge), and to consider
to which aspect of the utterance expressions of EP relate.
3.4. Based averrals
Not only must a distinction be made between attributions (source ¼
Other) and averrals (source ¼ Self ), a further di¤erence must in fact be
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made between based and non-based averrals.12 Based averrals give some
sort of indication about the evidential basis of the writer’s averral without
attributing propositions to an Other: Famously, John is an idiot is an ex-
ample for a based averral (rather than the non-based John is an idiot).
In fact, there is gradience between based averrals and attributions, as
seen in the following (invented) examples:
Attribution He said that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
Based averral Yesterday’s poll of activists showed that Mr Duncan
Smith was wrong.
Tests found that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
Non-based averral Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
As suggested, attributions are based on what Sayers/Sensers said or
thought (He said that), whereas based averrals can be premised on the
writer’s interpretation of data (a poll . . . showed that/Tests found ). The
distinction is a very ﬁne one and shows the gradience between attributions
and some types of based averrals (those that are based on writers’ inter-
pretation of linguistic evidence). This overlap is explicable by the fact
that both based averrals and attributions are part of the same phenome-
non, evidentiality.
Moreover, there is an apparent perceived similarity of structures such
as She revealed that I was wrong and It emerged that I was wrong. Again,
we need to combine the concepts of sourcing and evidentiality in order
to account for this, and the two questions to be addressed in this context
are:
1. Who is the source of the utterance?
2. What is the nature of the basis of the utterance?
As we have seen, with attributions the source (of the attributed proposi-
tion) is Other, and the basis for the Self ’s knowledge of the (attributed)
proposition is hearsay or mindsay. We could thus say that the basis is
‘outside’ the Self (it only involves the Self as hearer). Figure 1 visualizes
these assumptions.
Similarly, with some based averrals, although the source seems to be
the Self, the basis is also ‘outside’ the Self (see Figure 2).
Source ¼ Other /

He said I was wrong. (hearsay)
Basis ¼ ‘outside’ Self He thought I was wrong. (mindsay)
Figure 1. Attribution: Bases ‘outside’ Self
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Even though with these examples (see Figures 1 and 2) the writer does
not attribute a proposition to an explicit Other, s/he says that some
external basis exists on which his/her knowledge (that s/he was wrong) is
based. The writer is still involved, however, because it is evident that s/he
had access to this external evidence. The external evidence seems to be
construed as publicly accessible: it emerged that indicates that the propo-
sition ‘becomes known’ in general, notoriously also signals common
knowledge, and there was proof that presumably means that this proof is
theoretically veriﬁable by the general public. The similarity of these types
of based averrals to attributions can thus be explained by reference to the
fact that both involve external bases.
With other based averrals, the basis is not construed as external and
publicly accessible, but rather resides in the writer’s own subjective expe-
rience. This seems to be the case with at least some expressions of percep-
tion and obviousness (see Figure 3).
In Figure 3, the writer tells us that the proposition is obvious from
his/her point of view (though some externality is involved in that clearly
implies persuasively that the proposition is obvious in general, not requir-
ing evidence), as well as that the basis of his/her knowledge is his/her
own mental or sensory perception. With other expressions of perception
(sign that), however, the evidential basis may be construed as more exter-
nal and objective. There is thus no direct correlation between the type of
basis and the degree of subjectivity: rather, this depends both on the evi-
dential involved and on the context.
We could interpret such structures as being situated on a cline of sub-
jectivity, in terms of the explicitness in which the speaker’s presence is sig-
naled in an utterance (Verstraete 2001: 1513). The more the speaker’s
presence is explicit, the more subjectiﬁed the utterance; and the less the
speaker’s presence is explicit in the utterance, the more objectiﬁed the
Source ¼ Self / 9>=
>;
It emerged that I was wrong (unspecified)
Basis ¼ ‘outside’ Self There was proof that
Notoriously,
I was wrong (proof)
I was wrong (general
knowledge)




Clearly, I was wrong (obviousness)
Basis ¼ ‘inside’ Self It appears that I was wrong (perception)
It looks like
Figure 3. Averrals: Bases ‘inside’ Self
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utterance. This notion has for instance been applied to modality in sys-
temic functional linguistics, where the degree of subjectivity involved de-
pends on its realization as projecting mental clause with I as Senser,
modal adverb, relational clause, or modal verb (see Table 2 in Appendix).
The concept also ﬁgures (in a di¤erent way) in cognitive linguistics (e.g.,
Sanders and Spooren 1997; Mushin 2001), where it is assumed that ‘[t]he
more the conceptualiser [the speaker as Experiencer] is ‘‘presupposed’’ in
the construal of a scene, the more subjectiﬁed is the utterance’ (Mushin
2001: 9).
In contrast, I would argue that the subjectivity in the examples above is
not directly signaled by type of realization but more implicitly marked by
sourcing and the construal of the evidence as internal (more subjective) or
external (more objective). The dimension of subjectivity is deﬁned in
terms of Self access versus Other access to bases of information:
The alternatives within this dimension could then be phrased as follows: one pole
involves the speaker’s indication that (s)he alone knows (or has access to) the evi-
dence and draws conclusions from it; the other pole involves his/her indication
that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who
share the same conclusion based on it. (Nuyts 2001: 393, on subjectivity and epis-
temic modals)
Concerning sourcing and evidentiality, we can then argue that attribu-
tions and based averrals are situated on a cline of subjectivity, depending
on whether the sources and bases of propositions are construed as exter-
nal or internal (see Figure 4).
It is important to point out that the distinction between internal
and external evidence is not equivalent to the di¤erence between di-
rect and indirect evidence (Willett 1988: 57): both direct (e.g., sensory)












Figure 4. Subjectivity and objectivity
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3.5. Backings
What is interesting to note is that we can also ﬁnd in the corpus a
range of expressions that do not refer to a speciﬁc type of basis (such
as perception, obviousness, or hearsay), but rather relate to di¤erent
backings for the speaker’s knowledge (a term adopted from Toulmin
1969 who applies it, slightly di¤erently, to argumentation). Such lin-
guistic items indicate that a backing of some sort may be found in their
context. For example, expressions such as meaning that/that means, ac-
knowledgement that, and warning that all appear to be related to the pat-
tern ‘X represents the reason why I think that Y’ or ‘X represents the
backing for Y’:
(18) Police have never managed to trace her money, believed to be
stashed in secret bank accounts and o¤shore trusts, meaning that
MacDonald will be free to resume her life of luxury when she be-
comes eligible for parole in ten months’ time. (Mail )
(19) After MacDonald was led away in handcu¤s, Emmanuel Mar-
signy, her lawyer, denounced what he said was the injustice of the
sentence and promised to appeal. That means the trial will be
staged again in a higher court, with possible outcomes ranging
from acquittal to a more severe sentence. (Times)
(20) Mr Maclean’s decision to call in the rebels—the chief whip does not
normally speak publicly—was an acknowledgement that the lead-
ership is taking the threat of a challenge seriously. (Telegraph)
(21) The dissident MPs received a further warning that a lengthy leader-
ship contest this winter could wreck the party’s attempts to raise
money to ﬁght the next election. Lord Ashcroft, the former party
treasurer, told The Daily Telegraph that big donors were holding
back because of the sniping. He said the party was in the red and
had to raise £12 million to ﬁght the election. (Telegraph)
In all examples, it is indicated that the writer’s knowledge is based on
some backing that is mentioned in the context: in Example (18), the po-
lice’s failure to ﬁnd Margaret MacDonald’s money, and the belief that it
is hidden away somewhere are taken as the backing for the writer’s (cer-
tain) conclusion that MacDonald will be free to resume her life of luxury.
In Example (19), it is Emmanuel Marsigny’s declaration that is regarded
as a su‰cient backing for the writer’s (certain) speculation that the trial
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will be staged again in a higher court, whereas in Example (20), the writer
uses an assessment of an action as unusual (not normally) as providing a
backing for the judgment that Mr. Maclean’s decision is an acknowledge-
ment that the leadership is taking the threat of a challenge seriously. The
writer reconciles the cognitive dissonance that results from his/her knowl-
edge that the chief whip does not usually speak in public, and his actual
decision to call in the rebels, and thus to speak in public (which deviates
from the writer’s background knowledge about the chief whip’s normal
behavior) by concluding that this means that the leadership is taking the
threat of a challenge seriously (a mental state that cannot be observed
directly). Example (21) is even more complex: the dissident MPs are here
represented by the writer as having been given a warning, ‘an advance
notice of something that will happen’ (COBUILD 2001), namely that a
lengthy leadership contest this winter could wreck the party’s attempts to
raise money to ﬁght the next election. However, I would argue that warn-
ing in this context does not refer to an illocutionary act (as in he warned
them that ‘a lengthy leadership contest this winter could wreck the party’s
attempts to . . .’). Rather, the propositions attributed to Lord Ashcroft
(big donors were holding back because of the sniping; the party was in the
red and had to raise £12 million to ﬁght the election) are interpreted by the
writer as signaling that the contest could damage the party ﬁnancially.
They represent the backing for his/her conclusion (which, as indicated
by could, is of low certainty). This is very clearly an averral rather than
an attribution though it seems to ‘disguise itself ’ as an attribution by
using a noun that can easily be interpreted as attributing on a casual
reading (warning that).
That backings are not the same as bases becomes clear when we look at
the following examples, which involve both backings and bases:
(22) General John de Chastelain, the head of the Independent Interna-
tional Commission on Decommissioning had added to the sense of
[basis: perception] choreography by saying that the IRA had com-
pleted a third act of decommissioning [backing]. (Telegraph)
(23) The clearest sign that [basis: perception] the leadership realises the
danger is not yet past came when it conﬁrmed that Mr Maclean is
calling in the plotters [backing]. (Times)
(24) Mr Palios’s actions [backing] are a sign of [basis: perception] his
determination. (Guardian)
In Example (22), de Chastelain’s/the leadership’s utterances (saying that
. . .) are given as a backing for why there is a sense of (basis: perception)
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choreography. In Examples (23) and (24), the leadership’s conﬁrmation
that Mr Maclean is calling in the plotters and Mr Palios’s actions are in-
terpreted by the writer as a sign (basis: perception) that the leadership
realises the danger is not yet past/of his determination (again, mental
states that cannot be directly observed). In other words, the knowledge
that Mr Palios is determined is based on an inference by the writer that
is backed by his interpretation of Mr Palios’s actions.
These are very complex cases of epistemological positioning, which
point to the fact that EP in context deserves further examination (per-
haps in relation to Hoey’s 1983 concept of clause relations), and may
also have to take into account research on argumentation (e.g., Toulmin
1969).
4. Conclusion: Elements of EP
Despite the fact that there is no morphologized system of evidentiality or
EP in the English language, it has become clear that the possibilities to
mark assessments concerning knowledge in English are highly complex.
EP is hence a phenomenon that deserves more attention even in lan-
guages that allow only its lexical expression. Some of its aspects have
been outlined in this paper, which o¤ers a preliminary exploration of EP
in English. Even though I could only o¤er a very short and cursory intro-
duction to EP, what seems clear so far is that it is necessary to consider at
least the following elements (together with mirativity and extent) in any
analysis of EP in naturally occurring data (see Figure 5).
Further research is necessary to reﬁne this system of EP with the help
of more text-driven and corpus-driven analyses of di¤erent registers and
Who is the source of a proposition (sourcing): Self or Other?
What is the basis of (Self/Other) knowledge (evidentiality): hearsay, perception,
etc.?
Is the basis construed as more objective (external) or more subjective (internal)
(subjectivity)?
How certain is the knowledge of Self or Other? (certainty)
How is certainty of knowledge expressed
directly/explicitly (modality)?
indirectly (evidentiality)?
What are the reasons for (Self/Other) knowledge (backing)?
Figure 5. Aspects to be considered in the analysis of EP
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text types (cf. Hunston 2000 on bases in persuasive texts). After all, the
proposed system of EP derives only from the corpus at hand, and further
reﬁnements could be added. Areas that are delimited for future research
include the classiﬁcation of sources (for proposals, see White 2001: 4–5),
the connection between EP and the speaker–hearer relation, and the
pragmatics of expressions of EP. For instance, there is no implication
that expressions of certainty necessarily reﬂect the speaker’s/writer’s
actual certainty, or that speakers/writers truthfully mark the sources and
bases of their knowledge. Rather, expressions of EP are presumably used
for a variety of pragmatic and rhetorical purposes in naturally occurring
discourse (see Pomerantz 1984; Fox 2001; Downing 2001; Mushin 2001;
Bednarek 2006b on the pragmatics of evidentiality and research on epis-
temic stance in academic discourse).
Appendix: Tables
Table 1. The corpus
Newspaper Number of words
Broadsheet









The Daily Mail 8,826
The Daily Mirror 6,258
The Daily Express 7,798
Subtotal 32,796
Total 70,300
Note: The corpus consists of 100 ‘hard’ news stories covering ten topics taken from ten Brit-
ish national newspapers. (A more detailed description of the corpus is given in Bednarek
2006b).
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Table 2. Subjective and objective modality
Modality Examples
Explicit Objective it is certain (150), it is probable, it isn’t possible (615)
Implicit Objective certainly (150), probably, surely (615)
Explicit Subjective I’m certain that (150), I guess, I suppose, I don’t think, I know
(614–615)
Implicit Subjective must (150), could, may (615)
Cf. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 150, 614–615).
Table 3. Categorization of certainty of knowledge
Certainty Modality Evidentiality
High will seen, looked
Medium thought
Low perhaps, could appeared
Table 4. Chafe’s (1986) categories of evidentiality and their treatment in this paper
Categories of evidentiality Examples in Chafe (1986) Treatment in this paper




Markers of belief think, guess, suppose evidentiality: mindsay (if
attributed to Other)
Markers of induction must, seem certainty of knowledge
(must); evidentiality:
perception (seem)
Markers of hearsay people say, they say, I’ve
been told, Sarah told me
evidentiality: hearsay




see, hear, feel evidentiality: perception
Matching knowledge
against expectations
of course, oddly enough, in
fact, actually, at least,





sort of, kind of not discussed
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Notes
* I would like to thank Dr. Brigitta Mittmann, Prof. Wolfram Bublitz, and two anony-
mous reviewers very much for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper.
1. Knowledge in itself is a concept that is notoriously di‰cult to deﬁne (and no attempt to
do so will be undertaken here). Rather, I use knowledge in a pre-theoretical sense, refer-
ring to (true or false) information of which speakers/writers are aware, and to which
they refer in their propositions (including those encapsulated in nominalizations).
2. For a brief history on evidentiality see, e.g., Mushin (2001), Aikhenvald (2004), Den-
dale and Tasmowski (2001), Rooryck (2001).
3. Aikhenvald (2004: 63–64) identiﬁes the following repeated semantic dimensions of evi-
dentiality across languages:
Table 5. Rooryck’s (2001) categories of evidentiality and their treatment in this paper
Categories Examples Treatment in this paper




Sensory evidence, hearsay I hear/they say/(so), I’m
told
hearsay
Quotative Sarah said hearsay
Memory/circumstantial
inferential















I’m afraid, I’m sorry to say mindsay (if attributed to
Other)
Evaluative: (dis)approval I’m sorry/happy to say/tell
you
mindsay (if attributed to
Other)
Surprisal/admirative can you imagine! mirativity
Personal responsibility for
assertion/witness report
tell s.o./swear hearsay (if attributed to
Other)
Concessive admit/confess hearsay (if attributed to
Other)
Current relevance (you) understand? you
know?
not discussed
Note: Many of the examples mentioned by Chafe and Rooryck involve 1st person eviden-
tials, whereas my data includes only 3rd person evidentials (because I have excluded quoted
speech from the analysis). This distinction, however, may entail important functional di¤er-
ences: for example, those expressions that would be classiﬁed as mindsay or hearsay when
they concern attributions (believe, realize, say) are obviously not mindsay/hearsay if Self is
the source (on utterances such as I have to say I very much doubt it, cf. Hunston 2000: 190).
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I. visual: covers information acquired through seeing.
II. non-visual sensory: covers information acquired through hearing, and is typi-
cally extended to smell and taste, and sometimes also to touch.
III. inference: based on visible or tangible evidence, or result.
IV. assumption: based on evidence other than visible results: this may include logical
reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge.
V. hearsay: for reported information with no reference to those it was reported by.
VI. quotative: for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted source.
(For other cross-linguistic classiﬁcations of evidentiality see, e.g., Willett 1988; Roor-
yck 2001).
4. Cf. Pomerantz (1984) on using evidence in conversation; Chafe (1986) on di¤erences in
evidentiality between conversation and academic writing; Traugott (1989) on the devel-
opment of epistemic (including evidential) meanings in English; Biber and Finegan
(1989) and Biber et al. (1999) on epistemic stance (including evidentiality) in di¤erent
registers of English from a grammatical perspective; Norrick (1995) on the evidential
function of hunh-tags in conversation; Ramat (1996) on evidential adverbs (including
English) from a typological perspective; Watson (1999) on evidentiality and a¤ect in
Australian ﬁction; King and Nadasdi (1999) on evidentiality and code-switching be-
tween French and English in Canada; de Haan (1999) on the distinction between epis-
temic modality and evidentiality; Downing (2001) on surely as a marker of evidentiality
and stance; Fox (2001) on the creation and maintenance of authority by means of evi-
dentiality in American-English conversation; Mushin (2001) on evidentiality and epis-
temological stance in English and other languages; Ne¤ et al. (2003) on native and
non-native speakers’ uses of evidentiality; and Precht (2003) on evidentiality in British
and American conversation.
5. Furthermore, evidentiality is here used as the cover term for both the grammatical and
the lexical expression of the basis of information. Although there may be some argu-
ments for distinguishing between the two (see in particular Aikhenvald 2003, 2004,
who argues strongly against including lexical expressions as evidentiality), both realiza-
tions arguably have the same kind of meaning. On a higher, functional level, it is not
unreasonable to include both phenomena under one label (cf. also Ramat 1996;
Mushin 2001: 57). This decision is supported by the fact that some evidentials are the
result of a grammaticization of lexical expressions of evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004:
chapter 9).
6. Whether or not mirativity (un/expectedness) encodes epistemological considerations is
debatable. For example, Biber and Finegan claim that their category of amazingly ad-
verbials (e.g., oddly, amazingly) signals ‘attitudes towards the content independent of
its epistemological status’ (Biber and Finegan 1988: 8), whereas Chafe (1986: 263)
notes that such expressions concern ‘the match between a speaker or writer’s knowl-
edge and [ . . . ] expectations’. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere (Bednarek 2006a),
such linguistic items can be considered indicators of frame knowledge, and are hence
part of the analysis of EP. However, I think it is more problematic to include hedges
(Chafe 1986) in EP, but this will not be considered here. It might also be possible to
consider the realm of knowledge in EP, i.e., whether the knowledge is factual or ﬁctive
(see Mushin 2001), perhaps in connection with what Hunston (2000: 186) calls the sta-
tus of propositions: ‘the alignment of statement and world’.
7. The term modal is used in a narrow sense here, for expressions that indicate only
certainty of speaker/writer knowledge. The relation between modality and evidentiality
is far too complex to discuss here (cf. Dendale and Tasmowski 2001: 342), and some
researchers argue that modal expressions do mark evidentiality (Chafe 1986). For
656 Monika Bednarek
arguments in favor of the distinction between modality and evidentiality, see de Haan
(1999), Aikhenvald (2004).
8. In contrast, we might classify as text-based all analyses that adopt a speciﬁc framework
(e.g., SFL) and apply this to the analysis of texts. In fact, what Halliday notes with re-
spect to corpus-based and corpus-driven research is also true for text-based and text-
driven analysis: the two approaches represent a continuum rather than a strict dichot-
omy, and much research is situated somewhere in between (Halliday 2004: 24). Thus,
the methodology adopted in this paper is not wholly text-driven, but partly theory-
driven (i.e., it discusses previous research into evidentiality, and uses this as a spring-
board for the analysis).
9. For the analyses in this paper, the categorization system outlined in Table 3 (Appen-
dix) was used (though it must be pointed out that a scale of certainty is involved rather
than discrete values). Such a categorization is always subjective to a certain extent, but
there is perhaps a case for arguing that will, see, look express a higher degree of cer-
tainty than perhaps, could, and appeared, which seem rather similar in their epistemic
modal meaning.
10. Although it is theoretically impossible to know what someone else thinks or feels, this
is quite common in ﬁction when someone’s thoughts are represented with quotation
marks (in line with the convention of the omniscient narrator). In news discourse, the
case is somewhat di¤erent: although there is a mental-state verb (thought) indicating
mindsay, the conventional expectation is that the directly quoted material (‘mannered’)
has in fact actually been uttered by a Sayer (thus indicating Hearsay). Nevertheless, the
distinction between hearsay and mindsay seems theoretically valid, since it is reﬂected
in di¤erent attributing expressions.
11. These categories are not unrelated to the categories of evidentiality mentioned by Aih-
kenvald (see Note 3 in this paper), Chafe (1986), and Rooryck (2001) (see Tables 4 and
5 in Appendix), a fact that supports the decision to regard grammatical and lexical evi-
dentiality as part of the same phenomenon. Universally, it looks like more or less the
same bases can be referred to in di¤erent languages, whether lexically or morphologi-
cally. How these bases are classiﬁed is to some extent a matter of subjective interpreta-
tion on the part of the analyst. For instance, I do not distinguish in this paper between
mental perception (inference) and sensory perception, because the line between such
expressions is often blurred in actual discourse: it is frequently not clear whether the
information is based on (a) a sensory perception, (b) an inference based on sensory ev-
idence, or (c) simply an inference (‘mental perception’).
12. Hunston (2000) calls such instances sourced averrals but I prefer the term based averral,
because the deﬁning characteristics of averral is that it is not attributed to another
source. (Hunston appears to use the term source in the way it is usually used in studies
of evidentiality, but, as we have seen, it might be useful to distinguish carefully between
sources and bases of propositions.)
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